

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 AF-06 EUR-12 EA-06 IO-10 ISO-00 ERDA-05

CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01

PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05 BIB-01 FEA-01 NRC-05 (ISO) W

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R 131730Z MAY 75

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2880

INFO AMEMBASSY BERN

AMEMBASSY BONN

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: NPT REVCON: MAY 12 COMMITTEE II MEETING

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1. SUMMARY: IN FIRST DAY OF COMMITTEE II DISCUSSION,

ARTICLE III WAS GIVEN A "FIRST READING." MANY DELS URGED SAFEGUARDS ON ALL FACILITIES AS A CONDITION OF SUPPLY, SEVERAL STRESSED THAT THE IAEA-NPT SAFEGUARDS IMPOSED ON THEM POSED NO PROBLEMS, AND THERE WERE DIFFERENCES OF VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON PHYSICAL SECURITY. END SUMMARY.

2. UNDER CHAIRMANSHIP OF BARTON (CANADA) COMMITTEE II HELD MORNING AND AFTERNOON SESSIONS MAY 12. COMMITTEE DECIDED TO HAVE PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF ARTICLES III, IV, V, FOLLOWED BY SECOND LOOK AT IV, V AND III (IN THAT ORDER, IN RESPONSE TO THAI AND NIGERIAN DESIRE TO FOCUS ON CONCERNS OF LDC, AND NOT EXCLUSIVELY ON ARTICLE III). BARTON INTENDS TO MOVE QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, TO COMPLETE WORK BY LATE NEXT WEEK.

3. MEERBURG (NETHERLANDS) SAID IS TOO EARLY TO ASSESS SAFEGUARDS UNDER INFCIRC/153. NOTED THAT AS THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY GROWS, SURVEILLANCE AND CONTAINMENT, WHICH ALSO CONTRIBUTES TO PHYSICAL PROTECTION, WILL BE INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT.

4. VAN DOREN (US) WELCOMED THE PLENARY CONSENSUS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF SAFEGUARDS AND STRESSED THEIR IMPORTANCE TO US. HE OUTLINED THE QUESTIONS COMMITTEE SHOULD ADDRESS, INCLUDING EFFECTIVENESS OF AND SUPPORT FOR IAEA SAFEGUARDS; PHYSICAL SECURITY; AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARDS POLICY ON NUCLEAR SUPPLY, INCLUDING POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENT OF SUCH IMPLEMENTATION. IN COMMENTS ON THESE QUESTIONS, HE NOTED THE POSITIVE COMMENTS OF INSPECTED COUNTRIES AND THE CONTINUING NEED FOR DEVELOPMENT OF SAFEGUARDS, AND SUGGESTED THAT IAEA OUTLINE ITS NEEDS.

5. MOROKHOV (USSR) STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF SAFEGUARDS DEVELOPMENT AND IMPROVEMENT OF THE ORGANIZATION AND EFFICIENCY OF THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS DEPARTMENT. HE ASKED FOR FURTHER SUPPLIER COUNTRIES TO COORDINATE EXPORT POLICY, AND ASKED FOR SAFEGUARDS ON ALL NUCLEAR FACILITIES IN RECIPIENT STATES. HE NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF REGIONAL FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES, AND OF "MANDANTORY" PHYSICAL PROTECTION.

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6. DANMARK, THE GDR, FINLAND, BULGARIA AND HUNGARY STATED THAT THEIR EXPERIENCES WITH IAEA SAFEGUARDS WAS VERY GOOD, WITH NO PROBLEMS OR DISADVANTAGES.

7. ROMANIA SUPPORTED EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT SAFEGUARDS, BUT NOTED THE NEED FOR BALANCE IN THE IAEA BETWEEN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND SAFEGUARDS PROGRAMS. THE GDR WELCOMED THE UK, US, USSR UNDERTAKINGS TO PROVIDE THE IAEA WITH

INFORMATION ON THEIR EXPORTS AND IMPORTS (INFCIRC/207).

8. THE GDR, FINLAND (AT GREAT LENGTH), BULGARIA, SUDAN, AND NIGERIA ALL SUPPORTED THE POSITION THAT SUPPLIERS SHOULD DEMAND SAFEGUARDS ON ALL FACILITIES IN A RECIPIENT STATE, TO CORRECT THE DISCRIMINATORY SITUATION IN WHICH NON-PARTY RECIPIENTS NEED ACCEPT LESSER SAFEGUARDS. NIGERIA MAINTAINED THAT THE NWS PARTIES TO THE NPT ARE NOT COMPLYING WITH THE TREATY (APPARENTLY INTERPRETING NPT TO REQUIRE FULL SAFEGUARDS ON RECIPIENTS), AND HAVE AIDED SOME NEAR-NUCLEAR NON-PARTIES WHO HAVE UN-SAFEGUARDED FACILITIES. FINLAND ADDED A NEW PROPOSAL, CALLING FOR NPT PARTIES NOT TO IMPORT FROM COUNTRIES WHICH DO NOT ACT AS NPT PARTIES.

9. SWEDEN STRESSED THE NEED FOR STRONG NATIONAL SAFE-GUARDS SYSTEMS, AND FOR DESIGNING FACILITIES TO BE SAFEGUARDABLE. JAPANESE REP RECALLED ITS EARLY ACCEPTANCE OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS, NOTED THAT "EVERY MICROGRAM" OF DISSILE MATERIAL IN JAPAN IS UNDER SAFEGUARDS, AND MENTIONED COMPLETION OF NPT SAFEGUARDS NEGOTIATION WITH AGENCY. HE STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF NWS ACCEPTING IAEA SAFEGUARDS. HE NOTED EXTENSIVE SAFEGUARDS EXPERIENCE OF JAPAN AND LOOKED FORWARD TO ITS USE IN RECENTLY ANNOUNCED IAEA STANDING TECHNICAL SAFEGUARDS ADVISORY COMMITTEE. RE EXPORT POLICY, HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF "ADEQUATE MEASURES" BY SUPPLIERS, AND SAID THESE CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED BY CONCERTED ACTION BY ALL SUPPLIERS, WHETHER NPT PARTIES OR NOT. JAPAN WOULD COOPERATE IN SUCH ACTION.

10. JACKSON (UK) URGED THAT THE REVCON PRESS FOR COMPLETION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS BY PARTIES WHICH DO NOT YET HAVE ONE IN FORCE. HE SAID, AS IN INFCIRC/153, AGENCY SAFEGUARDS SHOULD ACHIEVE A BALANCE OF ACCEPTABILITY AND LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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EFFECTIVENESS. HE SUPPORTED THE INFCIRC/209 TRIGGER LIST, AND "ANY EXPANSION WHICH COULD BE GENERALLY AGREED." RE THE REGIONAL REPROCESSING IDEA, HE NOTED THE IAEA STUDY AND SAID NO CONCLUSIONS SHOULD BE DRAWN UNTIL THE STUDY IS FINISHED. HE SAID (IN RESPONSE TO JAPANESE) THAT THE UK VOLUNTARY SAFEGUARDS OFFER IS IN ADVANCED STAGE OF NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE AGENCY AND THE UK COMMUNITY, AND RECALLED STATEMENT IN 1972 GEN CONF THAT IT WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED WHEN NPT AGREEMENTS WERE IN EFFECT IN THE MAJOR NNWSS.

11. ZANGGER (SWITZERLAND) SAID THAT, TO PROMOTE RATIFICATION THEY HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE DRAFTING OF INFCIRC/153. HE NOTED THAT ALL SWISS NUCLEAR FACILITIES ARE REACTORS, AND THAT CONTROL OF ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING PLANTS WAS

MUCH MORE IMPORTANT. HE SUPPORTED A PERIODIC REVIEW OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS. HE SAID THE AGENCY HAD DONE EXCELLENT WORK AND HE IS CONFIDENT IT WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO.

12. SIAZON (PHILIPPINES) MADE DETAILED STATEMENT, CLAIMING ARTICLE III IS INTEGRAL WITH IV AND V. HE SAID SAFEGUARDS ARE WORKING WELL, BUT THAT EVENTUALLY AS QUANTITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL INCREASES, EVEN THE OP PCT CONFIDENCE LEVEL QUOTED IN AGENCY PAPER WOULD LEAVE LARGE ABSOLUTE AMOUNT OF MATERIALS UNACCOUNTED FOR. HE NOTED THE DIRECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAFEGUARDS FINANCING AND EFFECTIVENESS, AND SAID WE SHOULD LOOK AHEAD TO THE REVIEW OF THE SAFEGUARDS FINANCING FORMULA, WHERE IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO EASE THE BURDEN ON LDCS. HE SAID THE REGIONAL REPROCESSING IDEA WAS USEFUL, AND SUGGESTED THAT THE DEPOSITARIES PAY FOR AN ACCELERATED IAEA STUDY OF THE QUESTION. HE SUGGESTED THAT NWS PARTIES COULD ACCEPT ADDITIONAL UNDERTAKING NOT TO ASSIST NNWS IN ANY NUCLEAR MILITARY ACTIVITY.

13. VIRTUALLY ALL SPEAKERS NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF ADEQUATE PHYSICAL SECURITY. THE NETHERLANDS, SWITZERLAND AND THE PHILIPPINES SUPPORTED A CONVENTION ON PHYSICAL SECURITY. JACKSON (UK) THOUGHT A CONVENTION WAS UNNECESSARY, EXCEPT PERHAPS TO COVER EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON "MALEFACTORS" AND HOT PURSUIT. HERPELS (BELGIUM) SAW LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH A CONVENTION, BUT THOUGHT AN "INTERPOL" TYPE ARRANGEMENT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE. BOULANGER (FRG) AGREED WITH BELGIUM THAT PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS RAISE SERIOUS DOUBTS RE IDEA OF INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS, NOTING PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION THAT ADHERENTS ABIDE BY TERMS AND NEED FOR PARLIAMENTARY RATIFICATION BY EACH AGREEMENT, AND CONSEQUENT LACK OF FLEXIBILITY IN LIGHT OF EXPERIENCE. PHYSICAL PROTECTION WAS SOLE TASK OF NATIONAL AUTHORITIES; IF ALL SUCH AUTHORITIES COOPERATE, CONVENTION UNNECESSARY AND IF DON'T COOPERATE, CONVENTION USELESS. HE AGREED THAT IAEA SHOULD PROVIDE GUIDELINES OR STANDARDS WHICH NATIONAL AUTHORITIES WOULD INCORPORATE IN DOMESTIC LEGISLATION. DALE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NPT, PHYSICAL SECURITY, MEETING AGENDA, COMMITTEE MEETINGS, MEETING PROCEEDINGS, NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 13 MAY 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975GENEVA03491
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750177-0613, D750168-0877
From: GENEVA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750558/aaaacami.tel
Line Count: 214
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 01 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <01 APR 2003 by ElyME>; APPROVED <02 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NPT REVCON: MAY 12 COMMITTEE II MEETING LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
TAGS: PARM, UR, US, NL, CA, GC, FI, SW, SZ, IEA
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006